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War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, inaugurated
on March 9, 2005, is tasked with prosecuting crimes that were perpetrated during the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s, in conjunction with the trials at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY; see separate entry)
and in Bosnia’s lower entity-level courts. The crimes within the jurisdiction of the WCC
include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The WCC complements
the work of the ICTY, but the institutions differ as the WCC is located in Sarajevo, is
a permanent institution, has local staff working on the cases, conducts its trials in local
languages, and is governed by Bosnian domestic law (which incorporates international
human rights and humanitarian law). It was anticipated that these differences would
create the potential for the Bosnian population to feel greater “ownership” over the
chamber. In addition to prosecuting war crimes cases, the WCC, as part of the Court
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is responsible for harmonizing prosecutions of suspected war
criminals throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina (see entry on Bosnia-Herzegovina). As a result,
the Special Department for War Crimes in the state prosecutor’s office has developed a
database of all war crimes cases in the country and has been involved in the development
of a National War Crimes Strategy.
Political Background
Although domestic courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina had prosecuted conflict-related crimes
since the war broke out, the standards of fairness in these trials were criticized. This
contributed to the UN Security Council’s decision to establish the ICTY to prosecute
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Under the Rome Agreement of 1996, all domestic
indictments had to be approved by the ICTY before suspects could be arrested (this
process was known as the Rules of the Road). This meant that until recent years, very few
prosecutions for war crimes took place in domestic courts. However, in 2001, the ICTY
Office of the Prosecutor presented the idea of establishing a special war crimes court in
Sarajevo, as part of efforts to develop a completion strategy for the international tribunal.
Initially, this proposal received only tentative support from the Bosnian politicians,
many of whom held strongly nationalist views. Then, in 2002, the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) commissioned a group of experts, led by a former head of ICTY’s
investigations, to write a report on the need for such a court. The OHR is an ad hoc
international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects
of the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It has wide-ranging lawmaking powers. This report found that to develop domestic
efforts to prosecute war crimes, it was necessary to establish a special chamber in the
state court. The idea received the support of the OHR and the UN Security Council,
which was eager for the ad hoc tribunals to complete their work. Once the ICTY and
OHR had developed concrete proposals (the ICTY participated heavily in designing the
framework of the court), the Bosnian government became involved.
In 2003, a new Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia-Herzegovina was adopted, fol-
lowed by efforts to harmonize the criminal procedure codes of the entities (the territorial
units created under the Dayton Peace Agreement). These changes were controversial as
theymoved the Bosnian legal system from a purely civil law system to a “hybrid” approach
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that incorporated elements of the common law system. In particular, investigative judges
were abolished as part of criminal proceedings, and the possibility of plea bargaining
was introduced. The “Anglo-Saxon” methods were adopted in response to the dramatic
increase in organized crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina during and immediately after the
war, as well as a huge backlog resulting from delays related to the processing of cases.
These changes created the framework for the trials before the WCC. The legislation
establishing the chamber was then enacted by parliament at the end of December 2004,
and thirty countries donated funds to support its work, leading to the inauguration of the
War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on March 9, 2005.
Mission, Organization, and Activity
The Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina was created by the Law on the Court of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which was promulgated by the OHR on November 12, 2000. This law,
adopted by the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina on July 3, 2002, established the court.
In December 2004, this law was amended to award the court the competence to try war
crimes cases. As a result, the Criminal Division of the court is divided now into three
chambers: (1) war crimes; (2) organized crime, economic crime, and corruption; and
(3) general crime. TheCourt of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been described as a hybrid court
because, although it is part of the Bosnian domestic judiciary, there were international
judges and prosecutors among its personnel until 2010.
In the December 2004 Agreement between the OHR and the Bosnian government
on the creation of the WCC, the new chamber and the related Special Department for
War Crimes within the national prosecutors’ office were described as “an integral part
of the establishment of the rule of law principle in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Agree-
ment between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2004), and part of the signatories’ commitment was to “hold accountable
the perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law and the criminal law in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Agreement between the High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004). The
Agreement also stated that the creation of the court was necessary to ensure that the
Bosnian judiciary could receive cases transferred from the ICTY, as part of the interna-
tional tribunal’s completion strategy.
Initially, the trial panels and the appellate panel were composed of two international
members, appointed by the OHR, and one national judge. Most of the international staff
at the WCC in its early days were former ICTY officials, including several prosecutors
and some judges. However, since July 2006, judicial and prosecutorial appointments
to the court have been conducted by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and since 2008, each panel has been composed of one international
judge and two national jurists. The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council also appoint
the president of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who, since 2004, has been Judge Kreso
Meddzˇida.
The Special Department for War Crimes of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was created at the same time as theWCC and is responsible for prosecution
of war crime cases committed in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the conflict.
The head of the Special Department is international prosecutor, David Schwendiman,
and his deputy is prosecutor Milorad Barasˇin. The department has fourteen national and
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five international prosecutors, together with a large number of international and national
legal associates, case managers, administrative, and other professional personnel. The
staff is divided into teams that focus on specific geographical areas. In both the judiciary
and the prosecution, the involvement of international legal professionals was deemed
necessary to counteract mistrust of the local judiciary and to create the impression that
the prosecutions were impartial.
TheWCChas jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, torture, multiplemurders, and
multiple rapes, and adheres to the legal principles employed by the ICTY. The Special
Department is empowered to launch investigations of these crimes for both cases referred
from the ICTY (including cases where indictments have been issued, known as rule 11bis
cases, and cases where the ICTY prosecutor had not completed investigations) and cases
resulting from the prosecution’s own investigations. The WCC also has jurisdiction over
the outstanding Rules of the Road cases.
As part of its review of the cases, the Special Department for War Crimes of the
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia-Herzegovina has developed a centralized data collection
system for gathering statistical data on all war crimes cases pending before the domestic
judiciary. In the figures it released relating to cases before the courts’ and prosecutors’
offices in Bosnia up to October 1, 2008, the study found a total of 9,879 suspects and
accused. The term “suspect” refers to a person with respect to whom there are grounds
for suspicion that the person may have committed a criminal offense and against whom
the indictment has not been confirmed; the term “accused” denotes persons against
whom one or more counts in an indictment have been confirmed. In the context
of the ICTY’s completion strategy, the responsibility for prosecuting the thousands of
outstanding cases falls to the domestic courts. In addition, to identify the sites of mass
atrocity, the Prosecutor’s Office has developed “a catalog of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including genocide” that were committed across different regions within
Bosnia-Herzegovina (National War Crimes Strategy 2008). This catalog is intended to
facilitate “a preliminary crime selection” on the basis of available data.
The Special Department reviews the cases according to the Orientation Criteria for
Assessment of Sensitivity of the Rules of the Road Cases to determine whether these
cases are “most sensitive” and to be prosecuted before the WCC or “sensitive” and to
be processed by the entity-level courts. These criteria recommend that the Prosecutor’s
Office consider factors like the number of crimes, the number of victims, and the rank
of the suspects involved in a particular case. Crimes such as genocide, mass murders,
multiple rapes, systematic and widespread persecution, and the use of concentration
camps, which involve large numbers of victims, fall within the “very sensitive” category.
The expectation is that the entity-level courts will process the majority of the cases,
although considerable doubts have been expressed by international monitors over the
capacity of these courts.
From 2006, international agencies working within Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular
the European Union, called on the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia-Herzegovina to develop
a plan to improve the capacity of the domestic courts and develop approaches to harmo-
nize the capacity of courts at all levels to prosecute the remaining war crimes cases. In
response, theMinistry of Justice of Bosnia-Herzegovina created aWorking Group for the
Development of a National Strategy for Work onWar Crimes andWar Crimes Recovery
in July 2007. This Working Group was composed of representatives of the Ministry of
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Justice, the State Court, the Prosecutor’s Office, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council, and the finance ministries of the entity-level governments in the Federation
and Republika Srpska. The UNDevelopment Programme was granted observer status at
the Working Group.
In December 2008, the Working Group adopted the National War Crimes Strategy,
which prescribes a number of measures to improve efficiency in the prosecution of
war crimes cases, promote regional cooperation, and facilitate support and protection
of victims and witnesses. It also analyzed the budgetary requirements of the prosecu-
tions. The strategy anticipates the prosecution of the most complex and top-priority
war crimes cases within seven years and of other war crimes cases within fifteen years
from the adoption of this strategy (that is, about thirty years after the crimes were
committed).
Following the adoption of theNationalWarCrimes Strategy, concerns about its imple-
mentation have continued to be raised as deadlines within the strategy have been missed
and entity-level prosecutors have been criticized for failing to hand over information
relating to ongoing investigations. The president of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina has
attributed the lack of cooperation to political interference.
Victims’ groups and civil societymore broadly were not consulted on the establishment
of the WCC. The court does have an outreach strategy and a Court Support Network of
nongovernmental organizations was created, but the organizations involved suspended
their cooperation in 2006 because of what they described as the lack of interest in
cooperation of the court’sWitness andVictims Section. The court attributed the shortfalls
in its outreach policy to a lack of personnel rather than an unwillingness to engage.
Furthermore, there has been limited public attendance in the court proceedings and
little media coverage. This public disinterest has been argued to be a symptom of Bosnia’s
economic crises, which may make it difficult for people to take days off work and travel
to Sarajevo to watch the proceedings. In addition, public surveys have indicated that
respondents prioritize improvements in their living standards, the resolution of ongoing
disputes on the powers of the federal and entity-level governments, and anti-corruption
measures over the prosecution of war crimes.
Although since their creation, the WCC and the Special Department on War Crimes
have been heavily involved in building the capacity of the Bosnian domestic legal system
to handle the thousands of cases that have yet to be prosecuted, they have also been
active in investigating and prosecuting war crimes. To date, the court has issued several
notable judgments relating to some of the conflict’s most notorious events, such as the
systematic use of sexual violence in the town of Focˇa and the genocide at Srebrenica.
Conclusion
In the four years since its creation, the WCC has made progress toward its goals of
prosecuting war criminals, contributing to the restoration of the rule of law in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and harmonizing war crimes prosecutions within the country. However,
this progress has been slow and has faced considerable obstacles, in particular the lack
of political will for trials among some nationalist politicians and the limited capacity
of the entity-level courts. Furthermore, the sheer scale presented by the thousands of
perpetrators who may be liable for prosecuting is daunting. The adoption of the National
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War Crimes Strategy offers the possibility of a systematic approach to address these
problems, and it is hoped that is implemented fully.
Louise Mallinder
Cross-references: Bosnia-Herzegovina; Commission for Investigation of the Events in
and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995; Hybrid Tribunals; International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
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World Tribunal on Iraq
The World Tribunal on Iraq was an international citizens’ tribunal designed to investi-
gate, document, and bear witness to the illegality and injustice of the U.S.-led invasion
and occupation of Iraq in 2003 (see entry on Iraq). Organized within civil society in a
decentralized fashion and without a formal mandate from any government or interna-
tional institution, the Tribunal consisted of more than twenty sessions held in at least
thirteen countries between November 2003 and June 2005. Among other things, the Tri-
bunal examined theUnited States’ andUnitedKingdom’s legal and political justifications
for the invasion, the media’s role in justifying the war to the public, the conduct of coali-
tion soldiers during the invasion and occupation, the use of depleted uranium weapons,
the destruction of Iraq’s cultural heritage, and the torture, forced disappearances, and
other human rights violations allegedly committed by theUnited States and its allies. The
sessions publicly gathered documentary and testimonial evidence about the violation of
international law and about the failure of the international community to enforce inter-
national standards. The Tribunal’s findings lent open support to the antiwar movement
and offered recommendations for holding the organizers of the war accountable.
Political Background
The motivation for organizing a tribunal about the invasion and occupation of Iraq
arose from the conviction among antiwar activists that the invasion of Iraq had been
an ideologically motivated war of aggression that had openly violated international law
and that had been waged against global public opinion and in a manner that entailed
crimes against the Iraqi people. The rationale for holding a nongovernmental tribunal
